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Shockey: Constitutional Law - Procedural Due Process - Notice and Hearing
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS-Notice and Hearing
Required for Short Term Suspensions from High School. Goss v. Lopez,
------U.S ........- ,95 S. Ct. 729 (1975).

Rights and privileges protected by the United States
Constitution are broad and expansive. However, in the area
of minors' rights and students' rights, the courts have been
reluctant to extend the same protections as those afforded
to adults. Certain high points stand out, such as the decision in Brown v. Board of Education,' beginning the end
of an era of school racial segregation; In re Gault,2 requiring due process protections for determination of delinquency
proceedings; and Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School
District,' extending limited first amendment protections to
student expression.
However, students in public schools definitely possess
fewer rights than their adult counterparts in everyday life.4
The necessity and propriety of some restrictions on student
conduct is apparent from the very nature of orderly education.
Nevertheless, as has been argued,' students are severely Testricted in freedom by compulsory attendance laws and further irestricted by a multitude of rules regulating conduct once
they are in school.
Whether or not specific school rules and regulations
are excessively restrictive is not the concern of this discussion.
But the fact remains that a student's punishment for violation of school rules is often a deprivation of his education
in the form of expulsion, suspension, or exclusion from other
school-related activities. In today's America, few people
would regard anything more important to the pursuit of life,
liberty, and happiness than an education. So while local
school boards may still possess relatively unfettered authority
to promulgate rules and regulations to control student conduct, their power to deprive a student of attendance at and
Copyright@ 1975 by the University of Wyoming

1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. 387 U.S. 1 (1966).
3. 393 U.S. 503.(1969).
4. The area of protection against search and seizure is illustrative. Apparently
without exception, courts have declined to extend fourth amendment protections to students. See Buss, The Fourth Amendment and Searches of
Students in Public Schools, 59 IowA L. REv., 739 (1974).
5. See Buss, Procedural Due Process for School Discipline: Probing the
Constitutional Outline,119 U. PENN. L. REV. 545 (1971).
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participation in school has been questioned more successfully.
This case note highlights a recent United States Supreme
Court decision which limits the power of schools to exclude
students from participation in school without first providing
minimal procedural due process protections.
THE CASE
In February and March of 1971, the public school system of Columbus, Ohio, experienced widespread student unrest. As a result, many students were suspended from school.
Nine students sought relief in the courts by instituting a class
action on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated
challenging the Ohio statute' which granted authority to
school officials to suspend students. They argued that the
statute was unconstitutional in that it permitted a deprivation of their Tight to public education without a hearing of
any kind.
,AJI the students had been suspended for ten days or less.
None of the named plaintiffs had been given a hearing to
determine the facts underlying the suspensions. Each of
the students and their parents were offered the opportunity
to attend a conference with school officials after the effective
date of the suspensions. A three judge federal court' declared that plaintiffs were denied due process of law because they were suspended without hearing prior to or within a reasonable time after the suspensions.
Various Columbus public school system administrators
appealed to the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court upheld the lower court decision, declaring that students
facing temporary suspension have sufficient interests in their
education to qualify them for protection of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Court said that due
6. Oio RE'v. CODE § 3313.66 (Baldwin's 1973) authorizes the superintendent
of schools, the executive head of a local school district, or the principal
of a public school to suspend a student for not more than 10 days. Expulsion is also authorized. For either suspension or expulsion, the student's
parents must be notified within 24 hours. Provisions for hearing and appeal
are made for expulsion, but there is no such procedure delineated for
suspension.
7. Lopez v. Williams, 372 F. Supp. 1279 (S.D. Ohio 1973).
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process requires, for a suspension of ten days or less, that

the student be given oral or written notice of the charges
against him and that if he denies the charges he should be
given an explanation of the evidence the authorities have and
an oppoTtunity to present his side of the story. This procedural protection is limited, in that students whose presence
at school poses "a continuing danger to persons or property
or an ongoing threat of disrupting the academic process may
be immediately removed from school.'
THE SUPREME COURT'S REASONING

The fourteenth amendment protections forbid the state
from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law. Not all interests are protected.' The
Court first addressed the question of whether the students'
claim to public education was a protected interest.
Ohio's statutes require school officials to provide free
education to all residents between six and twenty-one years
of age,'" and provide for compulsory attendance." On the
basis of the state's decision to extend such an education to
people, the Court declared that the state must recognize the
educational entitlement as a property interest which may not
be taken away without adherence to minimum procedural protection.
In addition to a protected property interest in his education, the Court also declared that a student has an important
liberty interest in his education. This liberty component is
created by the fact that any state action which affects a person's good name, honor, reputation, or integrity" may have an
effect on the individual's community standing or reputation.
Charges by the school leading to a student's suspension, if
sustained and recorded, according to the Court, are capable
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729, 740 (1975).
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
OHIo REv. CODE §§ 3313.48, 3313.64 (Baldwin's 1973).
OHIo REv. CODE § 3321.04 (Baldwin's 1973).
These criteria come from Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971),
and Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
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of damaging a student's standing with fellow pupils and
teachers, as well as affecting future opportunities for higher
education and employment."
It was argued that even if the due process clause protects the right to a public education generally, a ten day (or
less) suspension is not so serious as to require due process
protections, since such a suspension does not subject the
student to a "severe detriment or grievous loss. "" But the
Court reasoned that it is not the weight, but the nature of
the interest involved which initially triggers the right to
procedural due process. 5 The inherent nature of a right,
such as the importance of education in and of itself, (without
comparing education's importance with another recognized
right), will initially determine whether procedural due process
protections should be extended. After that decision has been
made, then the weight of the interest threatened will determine
what process is required. Unless a deprivation is classified
as de minimus, l0 the deprivation cannot be imposed in disregard of due process requirements. The Court decided that
a ten day or less suspension is not a de minimus property
deprivation and should therefore be given due process protection.
Having decided that a high school student is entitled
to due process procedural protections before he can be suspended, the Court then addressed the question of what process
must be given. Recognizing the inherently flexible nature
of due process, 7 the Court decided that at a minimum the
student must be afforded an opportunity to be heard." The
opportunity to be heard must be preceded by some type of
notice in order to be meaningful. For the'student facing
a short suspension, the Court concluded that the procedure
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729, 736 (1975).
Such a standard was suggested by Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(1972).
This standard comes from Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
This standard was suggested by Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395
U.S. 337 (1969), Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), and Board
of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
The Court relied mainly on Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S.
306 (1950), and Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 (1914).
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should generally be of the following nature :"o The disciplinaxian, once informed of a student's misconduct, should informally discuss the problem with the student. This will satisfy
both the notice and hearing requirements in most instances,
and there need not be a time lapse between the notice and
hearing. Generally, the hearing should precede removal from
school. However, when a student's continued presence is
dangerous or disruptive, he may be removed immediately."
A hearing should then be bad as soon as practically possible.
In any event, for a suspension of ten days or less, the Court did
not require that the student be afforded the opportunity to
secure counsel, to confront and cross-examine witnesses
against him, or to call witnesses in his favor.
Two significant points emerge from the decision in Goss
v. Lopez. The first is that the procedure outlined by the
Court for short-term suspensions is a minimal protection.
All that is required is an informal discussion between the
disciplinarian and the student, generally before the student
is removed from school. At best, this affords the student an
opportunity to tell the disciplinaxian of gross errors, such
as mistaken identity. However, it is likely that the student
would have little chance in the informal discussion to prove
the charges against him are false, or the result of a personal
conflict between him and his teacher, or the result of a
multitude of other factors not likely to be accounted for in
such an informal process.
The second significant facet of the decision in Goss v.
Lopez is not as minor as the first. For the first time, the
Supreme Court has firmly recognized that a public school
student possesses both property and liberty rights in his education which will be protected by the Constitution and the
courts. The potential implications of -this "constitutional19. Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729,-740 (1975).
.20. This qualification in itself may constitute a rather large "loophole" which
would result in suspensions -without prior notice and hearing. What constitutes disruptive behavior, in addition to violent demonstrations and the
like? In the past, courts have found long hair, pregnancy, marriage, and
student newspapers to be disruptive. " It is likely that courts will continue to
be reluctant to second-guess the discretion of school authorities as to what
constitutes threatening behavior.
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of a public school student's right to be educated are
prospects for anyone interested in the much-litigated
students' rights. The balance of this note will be
at examining some of the potential changes made
by the decision in Goss v. Lopez.
PRIOR LOWER COURT DECISIONS

In order to understand the importance of a constitutional
recognition of a student's right to an education, it is instructive to survey the approach of prior decisions on the
topic. In the broad area of student expulsion and suspension, the courts have not been overly reluctant to protect
students. They have, however, been reluctant to specify exactly what rights were being protected.
The landmark case with regard to procedural due process
for students facing suspension or expulsion is Dixon v. Ala,bama State Board of Education,1 decided in 1961. In that
case, a decision to expel eertain students was made by a college
board without any notice to the students or any hearing.
The college officials argued that there was no constitutionallyprotected right to secure an education at a publicly-supported
educational institution. The court, without accepting or rejecting this argument, said that standing alone it was not
decisive of the issue of whether due process protections applied to expulsion from the university. Rather, the court
preferred to resolve the question by balancing interests of
the students and the state. The court noted that while the
state has a valid interest in maintaining order and safety at
a university, students have interests in their schooling in
order to secure a future livelihood, enjoyment of life, and to
be good citizens generally. The court then held that since
expulsion would deprive students of these interests, both
prior notice and hearing must be made available to them before expulsion. Although this decision implicitly recognized
students' interests analogous to the property and liberty interests delineated in Goss v. Lopez, the court in Dixon failed
21. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
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to go so far as to say specifically that there is a constitutionally-protected right to secure an education.
Since Dixon, the courts have univexsally afforded procedural due process protections to students facing expulsion."
Most cases involving expulsion recognize the gravity of harm
to the student that may result from expulsion. Some couxts,
on the assertion that due process is flexible, grant procedural
protection on the basis that the harm to the student is so
grave.2" One judge in the Western District of Wisconsin
repeatedly took judicial notice of the social, psychological,
and economic importance of education in today's society and
reasoned that deprivation of something so important must be
But in all these cases,
afforded procedural protection."
even though they involved complete expulsion from the educational pxocess, no court asserted that it was protecting a
constitutional right of education. The courts protected the
students' rights, but never explicitly defined what rights
were being protected.
The courts have been less unanimous in their protection
of students facing suspensions. The courts have in every instance required procedural protection for suspensions of long
duration." The reasoning of the courts in these long-term
suspension cases as to what interests they were protecting
is as vague as the reasoning in the expulsion cases. One court
22. Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967); Soglin v. Kauffman,
295 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. Wise. 1968); Breen v. Kahl, 296 F. Supp. 702
(W.D. Wisc. 1969); Stricklin v. Regents of Univ. of Wisconsin, 297 F.
Supp. 416 (W.D. Wisc. 1969); Vought v. Van Buren Pub. Schools, 306 F.
Supp. 1388 (E.D. Mich. 1969); Whitfield v. Simpson, 312 F. Supp. 889 (E.D.
Ill. 1970); DeJesus v. Penberthy, 344 F. Supp. 70 (D. Conn. 1972); Fielder
v. Bd. of Educ. of the School Dist. of Winnebago County, 346 F. Supp. 722
(D. Neb. 1972); Hagopian v. Knowlton, 470 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1972);
Black Coalition v. Portland School Dist., 484 F.2d 1040 (9th Cir. 1973).
23. Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967); Hagopian v. Knowlton,
470 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1972); Vought v. Van Buren Pub. Schools, 306 F.
Supp. 1388 (E.D. Mich. 1969).
24. Soglin v. Kauffman, 295 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. Wisc. 1967); Breen v. Kahl,
296 F. Supp. 702 (W.D. Wisc. 1969); Stricklin v. Regents of Univ. of
Wisconsin, 297 F. Supp. 416 (W.D. Wisc. 1969).
25. Esteban v. Cent. Missouri State College, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970), (two semester suspension); Pervis v.
LaMarque Independent School Dist., 466 F.2d 1054 (5th Cir. 1972), (suspension in February for remainder of semester ending in May); Murray
v. West Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 472 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1973);
Givens v. Poe, 346 F. Supp. 202 (W.D.N.C. 1972), (suspension followed
by expulsion); Williams v. Dade County School Bd., 441 F.2d 299 (5th Cir.
1971) (30 day suspension added to a 10 day suspension).
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remaxked that it was not sure of the purpose of the student's
argument that he had a right to an education," although
the court did recognize the importance of education in today's
society. The potential harm to the student faced with a long
suspension was the foundation for the requirement for procedural due process in some cases. 7 Only one court reasoned
that since state statutes created educational opportunities,
"Extended suspension or exclusion from school deprives a
student of important rights and liberties,"" though the court
did not specify what rights and liberties were denied.
Short-texm suspensions have not always been afforded
procedural protection by the courts. Two courts have held
that due process protections must be extended to suspensions
of 3 days29 and 5 days. 0 However, other courts have denied
procedural protection for suspensions of 5 days, 1 7 days,"2
and 8 days.3 In other cases, courts have indicated that
procedural piotection might be necessary for short suspensions, but that process requirements were met by later hearings, 4 or that potential disruption negated process requirements," or that circumstances surrounding the suspension
in question satisfied procedural requirements. 6
Most of the short-term suspension cases did not directly
address the issue of exactly what rights were at issue. Some
assumed carguendo that the same interests involved in long
suspensions and expulsions were involved." Only one court
26. Esteban v. Cent. Missouri State College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1089 (8th Cir. 1969).
27. Williams v. Dade County School Bd., 441 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1971); Pervis
v. LaMarque Independent School Dist., 466 F.2d 1054 (5th Cir. 1972).
28. Givens v. Poe, 346 F. Supp. 202, 208 (W.D.N.C. 1972).
29. Shanley v. Northeast Independent School Dist., 462 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1972).
30. Vail v. Bd. of Educ., 354 F. Supp. 592 (D.N.H. 1973).
31. Hernandez v. School Dist. No. 1, 315 F. Supp. 289 (D. Colo. 1970); Tate v.
Bd. of Educ., 453 F.2d 975 (8th Cir. 1972).
32. Linwood v. Bd. of Educ., 463 F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1027 (1972).
33. Hatter v. Los Angeles City High School Dist., 310 F. Supp. 1309 (C.D.
Calif. 1970).
34. Sullivan v. Houston Independent School Dist., 475 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1973).
35. Black Students of North Fort Meyers Jr.-Sr. High School v. Williams, 470
F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1972); Dunn v. Tyler Independent School Dist., 460
F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972).
36. Farrell v. Joel, 437 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1971).
37. Farrell v. Joel, 437 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1971) ; Tate v. Bd. of Educ., 453 F.2d
975 (8th Cir. 1972).
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explicitly reasoned that the right to an education is a protected
right."
Thus, in all prior lower court decisions concerning proceduiwal due process and exclusion from public schools, only
one court explicitly declared that the student's interest in
his education is a constitutionally-protected interest. That
interest, whether classified as a right or privilege, " now deserves constitutional protection under the decision in Goss v.
Lopez. The explicit recognition of the interest in education
as a protected property and liberty right is an important
step in students' rights litigation.
EFFECT OF

Goss v. Lopez IN

WYOMING

Wyoming has statutory provisions substantially similar
to those in Ohio which were involved in Goss v. Lopez. Wyoming's statutes direct that a free education should be made
available for all residents between the age of six and twentyone, 40 and provide for compulsory attendance. 41 Like the
Ohio statutes, it is evident that Wyoming's statutes create an
entitlement to an education.
Wyoming also has a statute on suspension and expulwhich conceivably allows for suspensions of up to ten
days without notice and hearing. Under the statute, the board
of trustees of any school district may suspend or expel a student for cause. Authority to suspend for a period of up to
ten days may be delegated to school administrative or supervisory personnel. In all suspensions or expulsions, notice
must be given to the student's parents within 24 hours stating
the reasons for the exclusion from school. If the suspension is
for more than 10 days, a hearing must be provided in accordance with the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act.
However, there is no explicit provision in the statute which
sion4 2

38. Vail v. Bd. of Educ., 354 F. Supp. 592 (D.N.H. 1973).
39. A distinction which is no longer recognized. See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564 (1972).
40. WYo. STAT. § 21.1-57 (Supp. 1973).
41. WYO. STAT. §§ 21.1-47 to -53 (Supp. 1973).
42. WYO. STAT. § 21.1-61 (Supp. 1973).
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addresses itself to notice and hearing possibilities for suspen-

sions of less than 10 days.
Interpreted literally, Wyoming's statute on suspensions,
like its Ohio counterpart declared unconstitutional in Goss
v. Lopez, would allow suspensions for up to 10 days without
notice or hearing. Apparently recognizing the potential for
suspensions in violation of the rules set out in Goss v. Lopez,
the Wyoming State Department of Education has formulated
a new position.4" The Depatment of Education takes the
position that Wyo. Stat. § 21.1-26(a) (Supp. 1973), directs
local boards of trustees to prescribe and enforce rules and
regulations for the operation of schools in their districts.
The State Department of Education has advised local boards
to formulate regulations which would satisfy the requirements
of Goss v. Lopez for procedural protections for suspension
of ten days or less.
If local school boards follow the advice of the State Department of Education and formulate new rules related to
short suspensions, and if the rules are adequately protective
and followed, then the question of the constitutionality of
Wyo. Stat. § 21.1-61 (Supp. 1973) will probably never ripen.
However, a failure of a local board to provide for the procedural protection delineated in Goss v. Lopez might be
cause for a constitutional challenge of the statute.
POTENTIAL EXPANSION OF

Goss v. Lopez

The traditional method to challenge school regulations
or actions has been on the basis of the reasonableness of the
regulations." More recently, judicial intervention on behalf
of students has been grounded on three additional theories."
First, the student can allege a violation of a substantive constitutional right, such as the freedom of speech issue in
43. Letter from State Department of Education, to Gary L. Shockey, Feb. 20,
1975, on file at Land and Water Law Review office, University of Wyoming,
College of Law.
44. This standard originated with Pugsley v. Sellmeyer, 158 Ark. 247, 250
S.W. 538 (1923).
45. See Flygare, Administrative and Judicial Remedies of Students, THE NATIONAL ORGANIZATION ON LEGAL PROBLEMS OF EDUCATION, CURRENT TRENDS
IN SCHOOL LAW 271 (1974).
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Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District." Second, the student may allege a violation of a right
created by federal or state statute. Finally, the student can
allege a violation of procedural due process, as was done in
Goss v. Lopez.
There is no doubt that the availability of this last type of
challenge is significantly enhanced by the decision in Goss v.
Lopez. But the question remains of whether the Court's
!recognition of constitutionally-protected property and liberty
rights in an education might be expanded somewhat to allow
students to challenge rules on the basis of a violation of a substantive constitutional right.
There are indications from some courts that the question
of whether students possess a right to an education would be
determinative of certain issues. The area of married students'
participation in extracurricular activities is illustrative of
this point. Traditionally analyzed on the basis of reasonableness,4" rules excluding married students from participation
in extracurricular activities have recently been challenged on
other grounds. Some courts have overturned such regulations
as violative of equal protection and the protected right to
marry."8 However, other courts have reasoned that since extracurricular activities are an important part of the entire educational process, the right of married students to participate in
such activities should be protected.4 9
46. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
47. See Kissick v. Garland Independent School Dist., 330 S.W.2d 708 (Tex.
1959); Starkey v. Rd. of Educ. of Davis County School Dist., 14 Utah 2d 27,
381 P.2d 718 (1963); Estay v. Lafourche Parish School Bd., 230 So. 2d
443 (La. App. 1969); Bd. of Directors of the Independent School Dist. v.
Green, 259 Iowa 1260, 147 N.W.2d 854 (1967); State ex rel. Baker v.
Stevenson, 27 Ohio Op. 2d 223, 189 N.E.2d 181 (1962) ; Cochrane v. Bd of
Educ., 360 Mich. 390, 103 N.W.2d 569 (1960).
48. See Davis v. Meek, 344 F. Supp. 298 (N.D. Ohio 1972); O'Neill v. Dent,
364 F. Supp. 565 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); Holt v. Shelton, 341 F. Supp.
821 (M.D. Tenn. 1972).
49. See Moran v. School Dist. No. 7, 350 F. Supp. 821 (M.D. Tenn. 1972) ; Bell
v. Lone Oak Independent School Dist., 507 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. 1974). See
also Warren v. Nat'l Ass'n of Secondary School Principals, 375 F. Supp.
1043 (N.D Tex. 1974), which held a student's membership in the National
Honor Society is a protected liberty interest deserving procedural due
process protections.
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The right of married students to participate in extracurricular activities may be posed as a two-pronged question.
Is education a protected right, and should extracurricular
activities be protected similarly ?"o Goss v. Lopez may answer
the first inquiry, thereby making it easier to argue that the
second inquiry be answered affirmatively. Certainly, this
type of expansion of the Goss v. Lopez rationale from a procedural to a substantive type analysis is not entirely implausible. It is also not limited to the area of married students
in extracurricular activities.

Is

EDUCATION

A

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT?

The right to a public education is certainly not to be regarded as fundamental. But the decision in Goss v. Lopez
may be as important a stepping stone to that conclusion as
Brown v. Board of Education1 and Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District."
It is true that in San Antonio School District v. Rodriquez' the Supreme Court refused to regard the right to an
education as fundamental. The Court did not apply the
"'strict scrutiny" and "compelling interest" tests to legislation involving educational financing in applying the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Court
expressed concern that it did not want to "create a substantive
constitutional Tights 54in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws."
Rodriquez reiterated the Court's historical dedication
to the importance of education."5 But the Court said that
50. See Berwick & Oppenheimer, Marriage, Pregnancy, and the Right to Go
to School, 50 TEX. L. Ray. 1196, 1203-05 (1972), for an analysis of the interests of a student in extracurricular participation. It is there argued
that extracurricular activities are as important as regular classroom work,
since colleges examine a student's extracurricular record in order to make
a decision relating to admission and scholarships, credit is often given
for extracurricular participation, and public funds are used to pay coaches
and other extracurricular sponsors.
51. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
52. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
53. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
54. Id. at 33.
55. Id. at 30.
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deciding whether education is a fundamental right does not
involve a comparison of the importance of education with
other fundamental rights such as the freedom to travel.
"Rather, the answer lies in assessing whether there is a right
to education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.'" Though Rodriquez found that the Constitution
does not explicitly or implicitly guarantee the right to an
education, Goss v. Lopez held that for limited purposes an
individual does have constitutionally protected rights in his
education. These rights, once recognized, may be expanded.
Rodriquez set out a limitation in its analysis that is important in this argument. In Rodriquez, the decision was
partially based on the fact that the legislation challenged
was positive in nature-that it was designed to extend rather
than deprive educational opportunities. 7 The "thrust" of
the Texas financing scheme was "affirmative and reformatory,"5 8 rather than negative. The Court might be more in-

clined to view negative legislation or regulations, (such as
suspension and expulsion guidelines) which allow deprivation
of educational opportunities, differently.
Of course, the decision in Goss v. Lopez was quite limited
and certainly did not go so far as to declare that education is
a fundamental right for equal protection purposes. The case
simply said that for the purposes of due process, certain
liberty and property rights in an education would be recognized. But the next step may well be to accord education
an even stronger constitutional position.
CONCLUSION

Goss v. Lopez decided that because he possesses a property
and liberty interest in his education, a public school student
is entitled to procedural due process protections before he may
be excluded from school, even for a period of less than ten
days. The decision may form the foundation to extend stu66. Id. at 33.
57. Id. at 38-39.
58. Id.
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dent's rights even further. But even if the courts were to
Teject further expansion of the Goss rationale in manners
suggested by this note, it stands as a vital decision.
One of the functions of our schools is to acquaint the
student with our social and legal processes. Without the
procedural protections afforded by Goss, the student could
easily learn that under oui American system discipline and
"justice" are meted out without regard to procedural fairness. This is not the process followed by our courts. After
Goss, it is also not the process to be followed in our public
schools.
GARY L. SHOCKEY
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